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Abstract
In this paper we consider an infinite horizon zero-sum differential game where the dynam-
ics of each player and the running cost are also depending on the evolution of some discrete
(switching) variables. In particular, such switching variables evolve according to the switching
law of a so-called thermostatic delayed relay, applied to the players’ states. We first address
the problem of the continuity of both lower and upper value function. Then, by a suitable
representation of the problem as a coupling of several exit-time differential games, we char-
acterize those value functions as, respectively, the unique solution of a coupling of several
Dirichlet problems for Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations. The concept of viscosity solutions
and a suitable definition of boundary conditions in the viscosity sense is used in the paper.
Finally, we give some sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium.
Keywords: Differential games, hybrid systems, switching, exit costs, Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs
equations, viscosity solutions, non-anticipating strategies, delayed thermostat
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1 Introduction
We consider an infinite horizon zero-sum differential game where both players, in their decoupled
dynamics, as well as the running cost, are also affected by some switching variable whose switching
evolution is described by a so-called thermostatic-type switching rule, subject to the evolution of
the players’ continuous state-variables.
More precisely, we consider two decoupled dynamics for the two players with, respectively,
state-variables X ∈ Rn and Y ∈ Rm, as
X ′(t) = f(X(t),W (t), α(t)), t > 0
W (t) = h[X,w](t)
X(0) = x, W (0) = w
,

Y ′(t) = g(Y (t), Z(t), β(t)), t > 0
Z(t) = h[Y, z](t)
Y (0) = y, Z(0) = z
(1)
where α ∈ A, β ∈ B are the measurable controls, and W,Z ∈ {−1, 1} are the switching variables,
whose state-dependent switching rules are represented by the second lines of the systems (1). In
particular, the switch from 1 to −1 and the switch from −1 to 1 occur at two different thresholds
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that must be reached by the continuous state variable (see Figure 1, and in general Section 4 for
more precise details). Moreover, player X wants to minimize, whereas player Y wants to maximize,
a discounted infinite horizon cost of the form
J(x, y, w, z, α, β) =
∫ +∞
0
e−λt`(X(t), Y (t),W (t), Z(t), α(t), β(t))dt
where w, z ∈ {−1,+1} are the initial states of the switching variables.
As usual, following Elliot-Kalton [16], we define the lower and the upper value functions re-
spectively as
V (x, y, w, z) = inf
γ∈Γ
sup
β∈B
J(x, y, w, z, γ[β], β),
V (x, y, w, z) = sup
ξ∈Ξ
inf
α∈A
J(x, y, w, z, α, ξ[α]),
(2)
where Γ and Ξ are the set of non-anticipating strategies for player X and player Y , respectively.
The main goal of the paper is to derive two suitable problems for Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI)
equations in such a way to characterize V and V as the unique viscosity solutions of those problems,
respectively. As a consequence, we will also get the existence of an equilibrium (i.e. V = V ) under
the standard Isaacs condition. To achieve the main goal we perform several steps.
The first step is to prove the continuity in the space variables of the value functions, that is, for
every (w, z) ∈ {−1, 1}×{−1, 1} fixed, the continuity of (x, y) 7→ V (x, y, w, z) (here and somewhere
in the sequel, by V , we will denote any one of the two value functions (2), regardless whether it is
the lower or the upper one). Under the hypothesis of decoupled dynamics and another decoupling
hypothesis on the running cost `, such continuity is proved using a suitable construction of non-
anticipating strategies. Indeed, in our switching differential game, we need the existence of some
non-anticipating strategies which make the players, when they are on a switching threshold, to
be able to switch or not (i.e. to cross the threshold or not) in dependence on its convenience.
At the same time, such non-anticipating strategies must not penalize the cost too much. In the
simpler case of an optimal control problem (one player only) this can be achieved by the Soner’s
construction of the so-called constrained controls [26]. Indeed, the switching problem with state-
dependent switching thresholds (as our problem is) is strongly related to state-constraints as well
as exit-time problems. However, for the differential game situation, the much strict requirement
that the construction of the Soner-like control must be non-anticipating (i.e. non-dependent on
future behaviors of the trajectories and of the controls), is a fundamental issue. Such an issue
was addressed in the recent work by Bagagiolo-Maggistro-Zoppello [2]. In that work the authors
studied (for the first time) an exit-time/exit-costs differential game in the framework of dynamic
programming and viscosity solutions theory for Isaacs equations with boundary conditions in the
viscosity sense. In particular, the fundamental issue above is there largely treated and solved
under the decoupling hypotheses and further controllability hypotheses. In the present work, we
are going to make large use of the results of [2], of which one of the main motivations was, by the
way, to arrive to study the thermostatic problem as the one here presented.
The second step is to rewrite our infinite horizon problem as four exit-time/exit-costs problems
coupled to each other by the exit costs. More precisely, the state space Rn × Rm 3 (X,Y ) is
divided in four partially overlapped sectors where the switching variables (W,Z) remain constant.
In each one of those sectors, the problem is seen as an exit-time differential game with exit costs
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mutually exchanged with the other sectors: the value function V has been evaluated on the new
entered sector when the previous one is left (i.e. one or both switching variable are switched), see
Figure 4. This step is achieved by dynamic programming techniques, using the decoupled feature
of the dynamics, a controllability hypothesis and the already proved continuity of V .
The third step is, using the second step above, to write a system of four HJI equations, one for
anyone of the four sectors above respectively, and coupled by the boundary conditions (for every
sector, the boundary datum is the unknown function on the other sectors). Using the results of
[2] on exit-time differential games, the value function V will turn out to be a viscosity solution of
such a system, where the boundary conditions are interpreted in a suitable viscosity sense.
The last step is to prove that V is actually the unique solution of the system of HJI equations
above. This is achieved by a fixed point procedure, using the uniqueness results of [2]. There, under
some hypotheses, it is proved that the value function V for a differential game of exit-time/exit-
costs type (when the exit costs are given, not as here, where the exit costs are represented by
the unknown solution itself) is the unique solution of a Dirichlet problem for the corresponding
HJI equation. In particular, the boundary conditions are interpreted in a suitable viscosity sense
that takes account of the min-max feature of the problem and benefits of the decoupling and
controllability of the dynamics.
Motivations and literature.
There are different situations that can be interpreted as differential games with dynamics
affected by switching. Just think to a pursuit evasion game (see Shinar-Glizer-Turetsky [24, 25])
where the switching dynamics is either the one of pursuer or the one of the evader. We can also
imagine a race between two cars where the switching variable(s) may represent the position of an
automatic gears or the diesel/electric regime of an hybrid car as in Dextreit-Kolmanovsky [15].
Also the well known shallow lake problem that arises in ecological economics (see e.g., Reddy-
Schumacher-Engwerda [23]) can be seen as a differential game with switching dynamics as well
as the international pollution problem with evolving environmental costs. Such costs, for less
developed countries, change according to their cumulative revenue, see Masoudi-Zaccour [22].
We point out that the above mentioned switching dynamics are also called hybrid dynamics. A
recent study of hybrid differential games can be found also in Gromov-Gromova [19], where the
authors formulated necessary optimality conditions for determining optimal strategies in both
cooperative and non-cooperative cases. A particular class of differential games with changing
structure is also considered in Bonneuil-Boucekkine [10], where the transition to renewable energy
leads to the change of the system’s dynamics, and in Kort-Wrzaczek [21], where the change of
a monopolist firm’s dynamics is due to the entrance in the market of a firm offering the same
products. The switching can occurs not only in the dynamics but also in the cost function as
for example in Fabra-Garca [17] where a dynamic competition is analysed and the market prices
change.
There are also mathematical motivations that suggest the study of differential games with
thermostatic dynamics, that are similar to the ones for studying optimal control problems with
thermostatic dynamics (see Bagagiolo-Maggistro[3], Ceragioli-De Persis-Frasca [13] and Bagagiolo-
Danieli[1]). In [3] optimal controls problems with dynamics inside a network are considered. A
delay thermostat is introduced to overcome the discontinuity’s problem arising when passing from
an arc to another one due to the different dynamics and running cost on each branch of the
network. In [13] the authors make a rigorous treatment of continuous-time average consensus
dynamics with uniform quantization in communications. The consensus is reached by quantized
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measurement which are transmitted using a delay thermostat. Similarly, in [1] they consider an
optimal control problem exhibiting several internal switching variables whose discrete evolutions
are governed by some delayed thermostatic laws. A zero-sum differential games involving hybrid
controls was also considered in Dharmatti-Ramaswamy [14]. Here, the state of the system is
changed discontinuously and the associated lower and upper value functions are characterized as
the unique viscosity solutions of the corresponding quasi-variational inequalities. Moreover, they
give an Isaacs like condition for the game to have a value.
Up to the knowledge of the present authors, the present work is the first attempt to study
a switching/hybrid differential game in the framework of dynamic programming and viscosity
solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations, and especially in connection with hybrid delayed
thermostatic laws and, more in general, state-dependent switching.
In conclusion we refer the reader to Bardi-Capuzzo Dolcetta [4] for a comprehensive account
to viscosity solutions theory and applications to optimal control problems and differential games
(for differential games see also Buckdahn-Cardaliaguet-Quincampoix [11]). Moreover other studies
on constrained trajectories and non-anticipating strategies as well as on possible relations with
optimal control problems and differential games can be found in Koike [20], Bardi-Koike-Soravia
[5], Cardaliaguet-Quincampoix-Saint Pierre [12], Bettiol-Cardaliaguet-Quincampoix [6] Bettiol-
Bressan-Vinter [8, 7], Bettiol-Facchi [9] and Frankowska-Marchini-Mazzola [18].
Plan of the paper.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the hybrid thermostatic delayed
relay, and its connection with ordinary differential equations. In Section 3, we briefly review
the results in Bagagiolo-Maggistro-Zoppello [2] about exit-time/exit-costs differential games. In
Section 4 we state the main assumptions about the infinite horizon switching differential game
under study, and we argue about cost estimates on the switching trajectories. In section 5 we prove
the continuity of the value functions and give a dynamic programming-like results, connecting the
infinite horizon switching problem with exit-time problems. In Section 6 we characterize the value
functions as the unique viscosity solutions of the systems of Isaacs equations.
2 The hybrid thermostatic delayed relay
A hybrid delayed thermostat with thresholds ρ = (ρ−1, ρ1), ρ−1 < ρ1, and initial output w ∈
{−1, 1}, is the operator
hρ[·;w] : C0(0,+∞)→ L∞(0,+∞), X 7→ hρ[X;w],
whose behavior is described by Figure 1. In particular it maps a time-continuous scalar input X
to a measurable time-dependent output function W = hρ[X;w] which can only takes values in
{−1, 1} and whose switching law is the following (see Visintin [27] for a more systematic treatment
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of the delayed relay)
t ≥ 0, X(t) > ρ1 =⇒ hρ[X;w](t) = 1
t ≥ 0, X(t) < ρ−1 =⇒ hρ[X;w](t) = −1
ρ−1 ≤ X(0) ≤ ρ1 =⇒ hρ[X;w](0) = w
t ≥ 0, ρ−1 ≤ X(t) ≤ ρ1 =⇒ hρ[X;w](t) = lim
s→τ−t
hρ[X;w](s)
if τt = sup{0 ≤ τ < t|X(τ) < ρ−1 or X(τ) > ρ1} > 0
hρ[X;w](t) = hρ[X;w](0) = w otherwise
In other words, looking to Figure 1, if at certain time τ we have hρ[X;w](τ) = −1 (which certainly
means X(τ) ≤ ρ1), then a switch from −1 to 1 can only occur (and must occur) at a possible
subsequent time t ≥ τ if and only if, at that time t, the input X crosses, strictly increasing, the
upper threshold ρ1, being X(t) = ρ1. In that case, it is hρ[X;w](t) = −1 and hρ[X;w] ≡ 1 in,
at least, a left-open right neighborhood of t, ]t, t + δ]. Similarly, if at certain time τ we have
hρ[X;w](τ) = 1 (which certainly means X(τ) ≥ ρ−1), then a switch from 1 to −1 can only occur
(and must occur) at a possible subsequent time t ≥ τ if and only if, at that time t, the input
X crosses, strictly decreasing, the lower threshold ρ−1, being X(t) = ρ−1. In that case, it is
hρ[X;w](t) = 1 and hρ[X;w] ≡ −1 in, at least, a left-open right neighborhood of t, ]t, t+ δ]. Note
that, by such a definition, and in particular because of the strict inequality ρ−1 < ρ1, the output
hρ[X;w] is left-continuous. In particular, we remark that, at a switching instant t, the value of
the output hρ[X;w](t) is still the previous one (i.e. it is not switched yet) and it will be equal to
the new switched one at subsequent instants after t only (if X has crossed the threshold). Finally
note that the given initial output w plays a role only if ρ−1 ≤ X(0) ≤ ρ1. An important property
Figure 1: Delayed thermostat with thresholds ρ = (ρ−1, ρ1).
of the thermostatic delayed relay is the following semigroup property. For every X and w, and for
every t, τ ≥ 0, it is
hρ[X;w](t+ τ) = hρ[(X(·+ t);hρ[X;w](t)](τ) (3)
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The switching evolution of W = hρ[X;w] can be also described in the following way. Looking
to Figure 1, we define
O−1 =]−∞, ρ1]× {−1}; O1 = [ρ−1,+∞[×{1}
which correspond to the sets where the pair (X,W ) can evolve without switching. Given X ∈
C0(0,+∞) and w ∈ {−1,+1} such that (X(0), w) ∈ O−1∪O1, the output hρ[X;w] is characterized
as the unique left-continuous function W such that
(X(t), w(t)) ∈ O−1 ∪ O1 ∀ t ≥ 0,
Var[0,t]W = min{Var[0,t]W˜ |(X(τ), W˜ (τ)) ∈ O−1 ∪ O1∀τ ∈ [0, t]} ∀ t ≥ 0
where Var[0,t] is the total variation in the interval [0, t] (which, for the delayed thermostat, corre-
sponds to twice the number of switchings in [0, t] (every switching has variation equal to 2)). Hence,
the switching law t 7→W (t) is the unique one that satisfies the constraint (X(t),W (t)) ∈ O−1∪O1
and, in any time interval, minimizes the number of switchings.
Such interpretation is also useful to define what is a the solution of the switching scalar ordinary
differential equation  X
′(t) = f(t,X(t),W (t))
W (t) = hρ[X;w](t)
X(0) = x, (x,w) ∈ O−1 ∪ O1
(4)
where f : [0,+∞[×R× {−1, 1} → R, (t, x, w) 7→ f(t, x, w) is bounded, measurable in t ∈ [0,+∞[
and Lipschitz continuous in x ∈ R uniformly with respect to (t, w) ∈ [0,+∞[×{−1, 1}. The
solution is the unique function t 7→ (X(t),W (t)) such that: i) X is continuous and W is left
continuous; ii) X(t) = x +
∫ t
0
f(s,X(s),W (s))ds and (X(t),W (t)) ∈ O−1 ∪ O1 for all t ≥ 0; iii)
minimizes in [0, t] for all t, the number of switchings of W , among all pairs (X˜, W˜ ) satisfying i)
and ii). Such a unique solution can be constructed in the following way: consider the evolution of
X1, starting from x with dynamics f(·, ·, w), and maintain such evolution until the possible time
t1 of switching for W = hρ[X1;w]. Then in ]t1,+∞[ consider the trajectory X2 starting from
X1(t1) with dynamics f(·, ·,−w), and maintain it until the possible time t2 > t1 of switching for
hρ[X2,−w]. Then, in ]t2,+∞[ consider the trajectory X3 with dynamics f(·, ·, w) and starting
from X2(t2). Since the switching thresholds are different, ρ−1 < ρ1, then the number of those
changes of dynamics is bounded in any compact set [0, T ], and hence, gluing together the pieces of
trajectories Xi, we get the unique solution of (4) defined above.
When the evolution is in Rn (as the controlled evolution of the next sections) we are going
to suppose that the switching dependence of the dynamics is subject to the evolution of a fixed
component of the continuous evolution X ∈ Rn: X · ζ where ζ ∈ Rn is a unit vector. We then
consider the (n+ 1)-dimensional system in the variable (X,W ) ∈ Rn × {−1, 1} X
′(t) = f(t,X(t),W (t))
W (t) = hρ[X · ζ;w](t)
X(0) = x, (x · ζ, w) ∈ O−1 ∪ O1
for which the same considerations as above hold.
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Remark 1 The previous definition of the switching rule W = hρ[X;w], as well as the subsequent
definition of the solution of (4), is certainly linked to an exit-time feature: for example, a switch
from −1 to 1 occurs if and only if the pair (X,W ) exits from the closed set O−1. And indeed, in the
following, we are going to interpret our infinite horizon switching differential games as a coupling of
some exit-time differential games with exit from some suitable closed sets. One can also recast the
problem as an exit-time problem with exit from an open set. Concerning the switching rule, it cor-
responds to the immediate switching when the threshold is touched (on the contrary, our definition
is when the threshold is bypassed). This, for example, would correspond to the fact that a switch
from −1 to 1 occurs if and only if the pair (X,W ) exits from the “open” set ] −∞, ρ1[×{−1, 1}.
We use the interpretation as exit from a closed set because it is more prone to treat the Dirichlet
problem from the Isaacs equation, since in such a case the boundary is “physically” part of the
problem, and it is even viable. However, assuming some suitable controllability conditions, as we
are going to do, the two problems (exit from the open set and exit from the closed set), are in
general extremely linked to each other, as the corresponding value functions in general coincide in
the interior of the set. This fact is certainly known for optimal control problems but we do not
investigate here such argument for the differential games situation.
3 On exit-time/exit-costs differential games
In this section we briefly recall the results of Bagagiolo-Maggistro-Zoppello [2], which will be used
in the next sections.
Let us consider two open domains ΩX ⊆ Rn, ΩY ⊆ Rm, with C2 boundary and two decoupled
controlled dynamics, in Rn and Rm respectively{
X ′(t) = f(X(t), α(t))
X(0) = x ∈ ΩX ,
{
Y ′(t) = g(Y (t), β(t))
Y (0) = y ∈ ΩY (5)
where for given compact sets A,B
α ∈ A = {α : [0,+∞[→ A measurable},
β ∈ B = {β : [0,+∞[→ B measurable},
f : Rn ×A→ Rn, g : Rm ×B → Rm,
f, g are bounded and continuous and there exists L > 0
such that for all x1, x2 ∈ Rn, a ∈ A, y1, y2 ∈ Rm, b ∈ B
‖f(x1, a)− f(x2, a)‖ ≤ L‖x1 − x2‖, ‖g(y1, b)− g(y2, b)‖ ≤ L‖y1 − y2‖.
(6)
We also consider the following functions
` : Rn × Rm ×A×B → [0,+∞[, (x, y, a, b) 7→ `1(x, y, a) + `2(x, y, b),
`1 : Rn × Rm ×A→ [0,+∞[, `2 : Rn × Rm ×B → [0,+∞[,
ΨX : ΩX → [0,+∞[, ΨY : ΩY → [0,+∞[, ΨXY : ∂ΩX × ∂ΩY → [0,+∞[,
(7)
with the assumption that `1, `2,ΨX ,ΨY ,ΨXY are bounded and continuous and that there exists
L > 0 such that for every a ∈ A, b ∈ B fixed, and for all x1, x2 ∈ Rn, y1, y2 ∈ Rm,
‖`1(x1, y1, a)− `1(x2, y2, a)‖, ‖`2(x1, y1, b)− `2(x2, y2, b)‖ ≤ L‖(x1, y1)− (x2, y2)‖. (8)
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We consider the differential game given by the cost, for x ∈ ΩX , y ∈ ΩY ,
J(x, y, α, β) =
∫ τ(x,y)(α.β)
0
e−λt`(X(t), Y (t), α(t), β(t))dt+
e−λτ(x,y)(α,β)Ψ(X(τ(x,y)(α, β)), Y (τ(x,y)(α, β))),
where λ > 0 and, for α ∈ A, β ∈ B, X(·), Y (·) are the trajectories given by (5), sometimes also
denoted as X(·;x, α), Y (·; y, β),
τ(x,y)(α, β) = min{τx(α), τy(β)},
τx(α) = inf{t ≥ 0 such that X(t) 6∈ ΩX},
τy(β) = inf{t ≥ 0 such that Y (t) 6∈ ΩY },
and
Ψ(X(τ(x,y)(α, β)), Y (τ(x,y)(α, β))) = ΨX(X(τx(α)), Y (τx(α))) if τ(x,y)(α, β) = τx(α) < τy(β),ΨY (X(τy(β)), Y (τy(β))) if τ(x,y)(α, β) = τy(β) < τx(α),
ΨXY (X(τ(x,y)(α, β)), Y (τ(x,y)(α, β))) if τ(x,y)(α, β) = τx(α) = τy(β),
(9)
and, of course, inf ∅ = +∞ and e−∞Ψ := 0 Roughly speaking, the cost is paid as the integral of
the discounted running cost up to the first exit-time of one of the two trajectories X and Y from
its set of reference, ΩX and ΩY , respectively. And then a discounted exit cost is paid, which is
given by three different exit costs, ΨX ,ΨY ,ΨXY , depending whether player X only exits from ΩX
(i.e. τx < τy), or player Y only exits from ΩY (i.e. τy < τx), or they both simultaneously exit from
their closed reference sets (i.e. τx = τy).
The exit-time/exit-costs differential game is given by the fact that X wants to minimize J and
Y wants to maximize it. We then define the non-anticipating strategies for player X and for player
Y respectively as:
Γ =
{
γ : B → A, β 7→ γ[β] such that
β1 = β2 a. e. in [0, t] =⇒ γ[β1] = γ[β2] a. e. in [0, t], ∀t ≥ 0
}
;
Ξ =
{
ξ : A → B, α 7→ ξ[α] such that
α1 = α2 a. e. in [0, t] =⇒ ξ[α1] = ξ[α2] a. e. in [0, t], ∀t ≥ 0
}
.
(10)
The lower and upper value functions are respectively defined as, for (x, y) ∈ ΩX × ΩY ,
v(x, y) = inf
γ∈Γ
sup
β∈B
J(x, y, γ[β], β),
v(x, y) = sup
ξ∈Ξ
inf
α∈A
J(x, y, α, ξ[α]).
Similarly to the non-anticipating strategies, we define a non-anticipating tuning for both players:
a non-anticipating tuning is any function K → K, k 7→ k˜, where K is either A or B, such that
k1 = k2 a. e. in [0, t] =⇒ k˜1 = k˜2 a. e. in [0, t], ∀ t ≥ 0. (11)
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Note the difference: a non-anticipating strategy is a function from the set of measurable controls
for one player to the set of measurable controls for the other player; a non-anticipating tuning is
a function from the set of measurable controls for one player to itself.
We then assume the following controllability and compatibility hypotheses
∀ x ∈ ∂ΩX ∃ a1, a2 ∈ A such that f(x, a1) · nX(x) < 0 < f(x, a2) · nX(x),
∀ y ∈ ∂ΩY ∃ b1, b2 ∈ B such that g(y, b1) · nY (x) < 0 < g(y, b2) · nY (y),
ΨY (x, y) ≤ ΨXY (x, y) ≤ ΨX(x, y) ∀ (x, y) ∈ ∂ΩX × ∂ΩY ,
(12)
where nX(x) and nY (y) are, respectively, the outer normal unit vector to ΩX in x and to ΩY in y.
Finally, we define, respectively, the upper Hamiltonian and the lower Hamiltonian for (x, y, p, q) ∈
Rn × Rm × Rn × Rm, as
UH(x, y, p, q) = min
b∈B
max
a∈A
{−f(x, a) · p− g(y, b) · q − `(x, y, a, b)},
LH(x, y, p, q) = max
a∈A
min
b∈B
{−f(x, a) · p− g(y, b) · q − `(x, y, a, b)}
Theorem 2 Under hypotheses (6)-(12), the value functions v and v are bounded and continuous
in ΩX × ΩY . Moreover they are, respectively, the unique bounded and continuous function u :
ΩX × ΩY → R which satisfies, in the viscosity sense, the following Dirichlet problems for the
Isaacs equations
λu(x, y) + UH(x, y,∇xu(x, y),∇yu(x, u)) = 0 in ΩX × ΩY ,
u = ΨX on ∂ΩX × ΩY
u = ΨY on ΩX × ∂ΩY
u = ΨX or u = ΨY on ∂ΩX × ∂ΩY
(13)

λu(x, y) + LH(x, y,∇xu(x, y),∇y(x, y)) = 0 in ΩX × ΩY ,
u = ΨX on ∂ΩX × ΩY
u = ΨY on ΩX × ∂ΩY
u = ΨX or u = ΨY on ∂ΩX × ∂ΩY
(14)
where ∇x and ∇y stay, respectively, for the gradient with respect to the x ∈ Rn variable, and the
gradient with respect to the y ∈ Rm variable.
In [2], an ad-hoc definition of viscosity solution is given and used, especially for what concerns
the boundary conditions, and in order to suitably treat the min-max feature of the problem and
the separation of the three exist costs. By a solution in the viscosity sense of the problem (13)
(and similarly for (14)), we mean the following: let ϕ ∈ C1(ΩX × ΩY ) and (x0, y0) ∈ ΩX × ΩY ,
then the following facts i) and ii) hold true:
i) if (x0, y0) is a point of local maximum for u−ϕ, with respect to ΩX ×ΩY , then we have the
following four implications (one per every line)
(x0, y0) ∈ ΩX × ΩY ,
(x0, y0) ∈ ∂ΩX × ΩY , u(x0, y0) > ψX(x0, y0),
(x0, y0) ∈ ΩX × ∂ΩY , u(x0, y0) > ψY (x0, y0),
(x0, y0) ∈ ∂ΩX × ∂ΩY , ψX(x0, y0) 6= u(x0, y0) > ψY (x0, y0)
 =⇒
λu(x0, y0) + UH(x0, y0, ϕx(x0, y0), ϕy(x0, y0)) ≤ 0;
(15)
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ii) if (x0, y0) is a point of local minimum for u−ϕ, with respect to ΩX ×ΩY , then we have the
following four implications (one per every line)
(x0, y0) ∈ ΩX × ΩY ,
(x0, y0) ∈ ∂ΩX × ΩY , u(x0, y0) < ψX(x0, y0),
(x0, y0) ∈ ΩX × ∂ΩY , u(x0, y0) < ψY (x0, y0),
(x0, y0) ∈ ∂ΩX × ∂ΩY , ψY (x0, y0) 6= u(x0, y0) < ψX(x0, y0)
 =⇒
λu(x0, y0) + UH(x0, y0, ϕx(x0, y0), ϕy(x0, y0)) ≥ 0;
(16)
The implications given by the second, third and fourth lines of (15)–(16) represent the boundary
conditions in the viscosity sense.
Remark 3 Note that in the definition of the boundary conditions in viscosity sense here above,
the exit cost ΨXY for the simultaneous exit of both players, actually does not play any role. This
is a consequence of the compatibility condition in (12), which is, in some sense, a sort of stability:
the exit cost for the minimizing player is larger than the cost of the maximizing one.
For the continuity and uniqueness results of Theorem 2, very important roles are played by
the decoupled feature of the dynamics (5) and of the running cost (7), by the controllability and
compatibility conditions in (12), and by the regularity of the boundaries.
In particular, for what concerns the continuity, in [2] it is proved that, under hypotheses (6)-
(12), the following property holds:
for every T > 0, for every K ⊂ Rn×Rm compact, there exist δ > 0 and a modulus of continuity
OT,K , and:
I) for every (x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ K ∩ (ΩX × ΩY ), with ‖(x1, y1) − (x2, y2)‖ ≤ δ there exists a
non-anticipating tuning β 7→ β from B to itself, and there exists a way to associate γ ∈ Γ to any
γ ∈ Γ, such that, for every β ∈ B, γ ∈ Γ, we have
i) 0 ≤ τx1(γ[β])− τx2(γ[β]) ≤ OT,K(‖x1 − x2‖),
ii) 0 ≤ τy2(β)− τy1(β) ≤ OT,K(‖y1 − y2‖),
iii) ‖X(t;x1, γ[β])−X(t;x2, γ[β])‖ ≤ OT,K(‖x1 − x2‖), ∀ t ∈ [0, τ˜ ]
iv) ‖Y (t; y1, β)− Y (t; y2, β)‖ ≤ OT,K(‖y1 − y2‖), ∀ t ∈ [0, τ˜ ]
v)
∣∣Jτ˜ (x1, y1, γ[β], β)− Jτ˜ (x2, y2, γ[β], β)∣∣
≤ OT,K(‖(x1, y1)− (x2, y2)‖),
(17)
where τ˜ = min{τx2(γ[β]), τy1(β), T}, and Jτ˜ is the integral of the discounted running cost up to the
time τ˜ :
∫ τ˜
0
e−λt`dt.
II) Similarly it holds reversing the roles of X and Y , γ ∈ Γ and ξ ∈ Ξ, α ∈ A and β ∈ B.
We point out that the construction of β and of γ are made independently on the behavior of
the other player. That is, β(t) and γ[β] are dependent only on the behavior, up to the time t, of
the trajectories Y (·; y1, β) and X(·;x2, γ[β]), respectively. This is possible essentially due to the
decoupling feature in the controls of the running cost ` (7) (see [2], section 7, Remark 12).
Note that i) means that the trajectory starting from x1 with control γ[β] does not exit before the
trajectory starting from x2 with control γ[β], and moreover, the difference of the two exit instants
are controlled by the initial distance of the points; ii) means that the trajectory starting from y2
with control β does not exit before the trajectory starting from y1 with control β, and the difference
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is controlled by the initial distance; iii), iv), v) mean that the distance of those (and other similar)
trajectories and their costs are controlled by the initial distances. Of course, if τx2(γ[β]) = +∞,
then both trajectories never exit, and similarly if τy1(β) = +∞.
This property is essential in order to prove the continuity. Under the hypotheses here stated,
its validity is proven in [2] (see Assumption 2, points 3) and 7) of Proposition 3, and (7)–(10)),
suitably adapting the construction in Soner [26] to the non-anticipating framework.
We are going to use (17) in the next sections.
4 The switching infinite horizon differential game
The decoupled controlled dynamics of the players are respectively given by
X ′(t) = f(X(t),W (t), α(t)), t > 0
W (t) = hρ[X · ζX ;w](t)
(X(0), w(0)) = (x,w)
,

Y ′(t) = g(Y (t), Z(t), β(t)), t > 0
Z(t) = hη[Y · ζY ; z](t)
(Y (0), z(0)) = (y, z)
(18)
where each dynamics is affected by a delayed thermostatic switching rule.
Here and in the sequel we will assume the following hypotheses and use the following notations:
Main Assumptions
• X(t) = X(t;x,w, α) ∈ Rn, Y (t) = Y (t; y, z, β) ∈ Rm are the states at time t of the player X
and player Y whose evolution is given by the trajectories of (18), respectively (here and in
the sequel, the names of the players will be identified with the names of their state variable);
• hρ and hη are delayed switching thermostat with thresholds ρ−1 < ρ1 and η−1 < η1, respec-
tively:
• W (t) = W (t;x,w, α) ∈ {−1, 1} and Z(t) = Z(t; y, z, β) ∈ {−1, 1} are the switching variables,
with evolution given by (18), respectively;
• ζX ∈ Rn, ζY ∈ Rm are unit vectors; X · ζX , Y · ζY are scalar products in Rn and Rm,
respectively, and represent the input functions t 7→ X(t) · ζX , t 7→ Y (t) · ζY to which, via the
delayed thermostats, the switching laws of the variables W and Z are subject;
• A, B (the sets of constants controls), A, B (the sets of measurable controls), Γ and Ξ (the
sets of non-anticipating strategies) are defined as in (6) and (10); a non-anticipating tuning
k 7→ k˜ is defined as in (11);
• (x,w) ∈ Rn × {−1, 1}, (y, z) ∈ Rm × {−1, 1} are suitable initial data;
• f : Rn × {−1, 1} × A → Rn, g : Rm × {−1, 1} × B → Rm are the switching controlled
dynamics of player X and player Y , respectively. Moreover they are continuous, bounded
and Lipschitz in the state variables, i.e.
∃ M > 0 such that ∀(x, y, w, z, a, b) ‖f(x,w, a)‖, ‖g(y, z, b)‖ ≤M,
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and
∃ L > 0 such that ∀(x1, w, a), (x2, w, a), (y1, z, b), (y2, z, b)
‖f(x1, w, a)− f(x2, w, a)‖ ≤ L‖x1 − x2‖,
|g(y1, z, b)− g(y2, z, b)‖ ≤ L‖y1 − y2‖.
• ` : Rn × Rm × {−1, 1} × {−1, 1} × A × B → [0,+∞[, (x, y, w, z, a, b) 7→ `(x, y, w, z, a, b) =
`1(x, y, w, z, a) + `2(x, y, w, z, b) is the running cost, decoupled in the controls, where `1 and
`2 are continuous, bounded and Lipschitz continuous with respect to the state variables; in
particular ∃ M,L > 0 such that ∀x, y, x1, y1, x2, y2, w, z, a, b:
‖`1(x, y, w, z, a)‖, ‖`2(x, y, w, z, b)‖ ≤M,
‖`1(x1, y1, w, z, a)− `1(x2, y2, w, z, a)‖ ≤ L‖(x1, y1)− (x2, y2)‖,
‖`2(x1, y1, w, z, b)− `2(x2, y2, w, z, b)‖ ≤ L‖(x1, y1)− (x2, y2)‖.
• λ > 0 is the discount factor.
We consider an infinite horizon discounted problem where, as usual, X wants to minimize and
Y wants to maximizes a cost of the form
J(x, y, w, z, α, β) =
∫ +∞
0
e−λt`(X(t), Y (t),W (t), Z(t), α(t), β(t))dt,
Note that the cost J is also depending on the switching variables W and Z.
We then define the lower and upper value functions as, respectively
V (x, y, w, z) = inf
γ∈Γ
sup
β∈B
J(x, y, w, z, γ[β], β),
V (x, y, w, z) = sup
ξ∈Ξ
inf
α∈A
J(x, y, w, z, α, ξ[α]).
(19)
In order to simplify notations, we assume that ζX and ζY are the first unit canonical vectors, so
that X1 = X · ζX and Y1 = Y · ζY are the first coordinates of X and Y , respectively.
Let us consider the evolution of X given by (18). We can interpret such an evolution as a switching
evolution governed by two dynamics-modes, f(·, 1, ·) and f(·,−1, ·), where the switching between
the two modes is governed by the delayed thermostat hρ subject to the evolution of X1. Similarly,
the evolution of the player Y given by (18), which is affected by the delayed thermostat hη subject
to the evolution of Y1, switches between the two dynamics g(·, 1, ·) and g(·,−1, ·). The behavior
of the projection on the first coordinates of X and Y respectively is described by Figure 2. For
example, for given controls α ∈ A, and β ∈ B, the filled curve is the evolution with dynamics
(f(·,−1, α), g(·, 1, β)), the short dashed curve is the evolution with (f(·, 1, α), g(·, 1, β)), the long
dashed curve is the evolution with (f(·, 1, α), g(·,−1, β)) and the point-dashed one is the evolution
with (f(·,−1, α), g(·,−1, β)).
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Figure 2: The trajectory of the pair (X1, Y1) in the plane
As it is easily deduced by the trajectories described in Figure 2, the state space Rn×Rm can be
divided in 4 (non-disjointed, but overlapped) closed sectors, every one indexed by the corresponding
2-string (w, z) of 1 and −1. More precisely
Rn × Rm =
⋃
(w,z)∈{−1,1}2
B(w,z) =
(
B(1,1) ∪B(1,−1) ∪B(−1,1) ∪B(−1,−1)
)
where
B(1,1) = [ρ−1,+∞[×Rn−1 × [η−1,+∞[×Rm−1,
B(1,−1) = [ρ−1,+∞[×Rn−1×]−∞, η1]× Rm−1,
B(−1,1) =]−∞, ρ1]× Rn−1 × [η−1,+∞[×Rm−1,
B(−1,−1) =]−∞, ρ1]× Rn−1×]−∞, η1]× Rm−1.
(20)
When we start to move inside one of the sectors, then we continue to move in the same mode
(f(·, w, ·), g(·, z, ·)) until we leave that sector, and after that we move in the new modality (corre-
sponding to the index of the new sector) determined by the delayed thermostatic switching rules
hρ and hη.
In the next section we are going to interpret the switching infinite horizon problem as four exit-
time/exit-costs problems, one per every sectors, and coupled by mutually exchanged exit-costs.
In order to recast such exit-time/exit-costs problems in the framework of Section 3, let us note
that every sector is of the form B(w,z) = Ω
w
X × Ω
z
Y where, for example, Ω
1
X = [ρ−1,+∞[×Rn−1
and Ω
1
Y = [η−1,+∞[×Rm−1. Note that ∂ΩwX = {ρ−w} × Rn−1 and ∂ΩzY = {η−z} × Rm−1, that
is the boundaries are the switching thresholds points (and the threshold is crossed when the first
component crosses it). Moreover, we also require the following controllability assumption
∀ w ∈ {−1, 1}, ∀x ∈ ∂ΩwX ∃ a1, a2 ∈ A
such that f1(x,w, a1) < 0 < f1(x,w, a2),
∀ z ∈ {−1, 1}, ∀y ∈ ∂ΩzY ∃ b1, b2 ∈ B
such that g1(y, z, b1) < 0 < g1(y, z, b2),
(21)
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where f1 and g1 are, respectively, the first component of the dynamics f and g. Note that (21)
means that, when X or Y are in a switching threshold, then, due to the decoupled feature of the
dynamics, they can freely choose whether to switch or not (remember that a switch occur only
when the threshold is bypassed).
Finally, note that whenever a finite time T > 0, is fixed, then any pair of switching trajectories
(W,Z) given by (18) can switch only an a-priori bounded finite number of times in [0, T ]. This is
true because the dynamics are bounded and the thresholds are disjoint: for example, the trajectory
X1 needs a uniform positive time t > 0 in order to pass from ρ−1 to ρ1 and vice-versa. Let NT > 0
be such an a-priori bound for the number of switches in [0, T ]. For every (x, y, w, z) and every
control α ∈ A, β ∈ B, and for every T > 0 we then have a finite sequence of switching instants
(possibly empty, if the trajectories never switch) in [0, T ]:
τ1X(x,w, α) < τ
2
X(x,w, α) < · · · < τNXX (x,w, α)
τ1Y (y, z, β) < τ
2
Y (y, z, β) < · · · < τNYY (y, z, β)
τ1XY (x, y, w, z, α, β) < τ
2
XY (x, y, w, z, α, β) < · · · < τNXYXY (x, y, w, z, α, β)
(22)
with N = NX +NY +NXY ≤ NT , and where τX correspond to switches of X only, τY to switches
of Y only, and τXY to simultaneous switches of X and Y (which means τX = τY ). We can merge
such three sequences, in order to get a unique sequence
τ0 := 0 ≤ τ1 < τ2 < · · · < τN ≤ T =: τN+1, N ≤ NT . (23)
Moreover, we denote by (w, z)i the new values of the switching variables after the i-th switch,
i = 1, . . . , N , and define (w, z)0 = (w, z). We have
JT (x, y, w, z, α, β) =
N+1∑
i=1
∫ τ i
τ i−1
e−λt`
(
X(t), Y (t), (w, z)i−1, α(t), β(t)
)
dt =
N+1∑
i=1
e−λτ
i−1
∫ τ i−τ i−1
0
e−λt`
(
Xi−1(t), Y i−1(t), (w, z)i−1, αi−1, βi−1
)
dt =
N+1∑
i=1
e−λτ
i−1
J(τ i−τ i−1)
(
X(τ i−1), Y (τ i−1), (w, z)i−1, αi−1, βi−1
)
(24)
where (Xi−1, Y i−1) is the trajectory starting from (X(τ i−1), Y (τ i−1), (w, z)i−1) with controls
(αi−1(·), βi−1(·)) = (α(·+ τ i−1), β(·+ τ i−1)).
Using the representation (24), in the spirit of (17), we now construct a non-anticipating tuning
and a non-anticipating strategy which work for our switching problem. Take µ > 0 such that
if a trajectory switches at time τ , then it does not switch in the time interval [τ, τ + µ]. Take
T > 0 and K ⊂ Rn × Rm compact. Fix (w, z) and (x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ K ∩ B(w,z) such that
‖(x1, y1) − (x2, y2)‖ ≤ δ, where δ is as in (17), and moreover such that OT,K(eLT δ) < µ/2. Take
β ∈ B and γ ∈ Γ. By (17), with the notations of (22), we get the non-anticipating tuning β0 and
the non-anticipating strategy γ0 such that
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0 ≤ τ1Y (y2, z, β
0
)− τ1Y (y1, z, β) ≤ OT,K(‖y1 − y2‖)
0 ≤ τ1X(x1, w, γ0[β])− τ1X(x2, w, γ[β]) ≤ OT,K(‖x1 − x2‖),
‖Y1(τ1Y (y1, z, β))− Y2(τ1Y (y2, z, β
0
))‖ ≤ OT,K(‖y1 − y2‖)
‖X1(τ1X(x1, w, γ0[β]))−X2(τ1X(x2, w, γ[β]))‖ ≤ OT,K(‖x1 − x2‖)
‖Jτ1(x1, y1, w, z, γ0[β0], β)− Jτ1(x2, y2, w, z, γ[β0], β0) ≤
OT,K(‖(x1, y1)− (x2, y2)‖)
(25)
where τ1 = min{τ1X(x2, w, γ[β]), τ1Y (y1, z, β), T}. Our goal is to estimate the difference of the two
JT costs. If τ
1 = T , then we are done. Otherwise, we have some cases. We analyze some of them,
being the others similarly treated.
1) Suppose that, using the notation of (23),
τ1 = τ1X(x2, w, γ[β]) < τ
2 = τ1Y (y1, z, β) <
τ3 = τ1X(x1, w, γ
0[β]) < τ4 = τ1Y (y2, z, β
0
)
τ2 − τ1 ≤ OT,K(‖(x1, y1)− (x2, y2)‖)
By (25), this implies that all four switchings occur in a lap of time not grater than 2OT,K(‖(x1, y1)−
(x2, y2)‖) < µ, which also implies that, in the meanwhile, no trajectory can switch two times. We
then have the pairs (X1(τ
3),−w), X2(τ4),−w), as well as the pairs (Y1(τ4),−z), (Y2(τ4),−z).
At the instant τ3, X1 updates its non-anticipating strategy using γ
1, as given in the view of (17),
referring to the points (X1(τ
3),−w), (X2(τ3),−w), to the trajectory X2(·;X2(τ3),−w, γ[β](· +
τ3)]), and with respect the exit from Ω
−w
X , in the time interval [0, T − τ3]. Similarly, at τ4, Y2
updates its non-anticipating tuning using β
1
as given in the view of (17), referring to the points
(Y1(τ
4),−z), (Y2(τ4),−z), to the trajectory Y1(·;Y1(τ4),−z, β(· + τ4)), and with respect to the
exit from Ω
−z
Y , in the time interval [0, T − τ4]. Gluing together, we get the non-anticipating tuning
and non-anticipating strategy
β 7→ βˆ : t 7→
{
β
0
(t) if 0 ≤ t ≤ τ4
β
1
(t− τ4) if t > τ4 ∀β ∈ B (26)
β 7→ γˆ[β] : t 7→
{
γ0[β](t) if 0 ≤ t ≤ τ3
γ1[β](t− τ3) if t > τ3 ∀β ∈ B (27)
Note that such constructions are non-anticipating in the sense of (10), (11), because they use
already given non-anticipating constructions and glue them in dependence of the behavior of the
trajectories (solutions of (18)), which are non-anticipating (the state-position only depends on the
past behavior).
Let τ5 ≥ τ4 be a possible subsequent switching of one of the trajectories when continuing to
move with βˆ and γˆ[βˆ]. Hence, looking to (24), we have
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Jτ5(x1, y1, w, z, γˆ[βˆ], β)− Jτ5(x2, y2, γ[βˆ], βˆ) =
Jτ1(x1, y1, w, z, γ
0[β
0
], β)− Jτ1(x2, y2, w, z, γ[β0], β0))+
4∑
i=2
e−λτ
i−1 (
J1(τ i−τ i−1) − J2(τ i−τ i−1)
)
+
e−λτ
4
(
J(τ5−τ4)(X1(τ4), Y1(τ4),−w,−z, γ1[βˆ](·+ τ4 − τ3), β(·+ τ4))−
J(τ5−τ4)(X2(τ4), Y2(τ4),−w,−z, γ[βˆ](·+ τ4), β1)
)
(28)
Note that, by semigroup properties and definition of γ1, for t ≥ 0, γ1[βˆ](·+ τ4 − τ3) corresponds
to the non-anticipating strategy constructed for X1 as in (17), taking the points (X1(τ
4),−w),
(X2(τ
4),−w) as references, together with the trajectory X2(·;X2(τ4),−w, γ[βˆ](·+ τ4)), and with
respect to the exit from Ω
−w
X and the time interval [τ
4, T ].
By (25) and a similar estimate for J(τ5−τ4), the difference in the second line and the one in the
fourth and fifth lines of (28), are bounded by OK,Y (eLT ‖(x1, y1)− (x2, y2)‖), whereas the addenda
inside the summation in the third line are all bounded by 2MOK,Y (‖(x1, y1)− (x2, y2)‖) because
they consist of integrals of ` in time interval with length less than OK,Y (‖(x1, y1)− (x2, y2)‖), and
` is bounded by M .
2) Suppose that, using the notation as in the case 1) here above, τ1 = τ1X(x2, w, γ[β]) <
τ1Y (y1, z, β) but τ
1
Y (y1, z, β)− τ1X(x2, w, γ[β]) > OT,K(‖(x1, y1)− (x2, y2)‖). Then it is certainly
τ1 = τ1X(x2, w, γ[β]) ≤ τ2 = τ1X(x1, w, γ0[β]) <
τ3 = τ1Y (y1, z, β) ≤ τ4 = τ1Y (y2, z, β
0
).
where max{τ2 − τ1, τ4 − τ3} ≤ OT,K(‖(x1, y1) − (x2, y2)‖). In this case, X1 update its non-
anticipating strategy at τ3 and Y2 at τ
4, as in the case 1). As in this case, for a subsequent
switching instant τ5, the differences between the costs J(τ i−τ i−1) are all estimated in a similar way
as in (28).
Putting together cases 1) and 2) and the others which are similarly treated, and in particular
considering that, in the time interval [0, T ] there can be only a finite number of switching NT ,
wethen get that the following:
Proposition 4 Given the Main Assumptions and (21), then, for any T > 0, for any K ⊂ Rn×Rm
compact there exist δ > 0 and a modulus of continuity ωT,K such that for every (w, z) and for every
(x1, w1), (x2, y2) ∈ B(w,z) ∩K with ‖(x1, y1) − (x2, y2)‖ ≤ δ, there exist a way to associate γˆ ∈ Γ
to any γ ∈ Γ and a non-anticipating tuning β 7→ βˆ on B such that
JT (x1, y1, w, z, γˆ[βˆ], β)− JT (x2, y2, w, z, γ[βˆ], βˆ) ≤ ωT,K(‖(x1, y1)− (x2, y2)‖ (29)
Similarly it holds reversing the roles of X and Y , α ∈ A and β ∈ B, γ ∈ Γ and ξ ∈ Ξ.
5 Continuity and switched DPP
Proposition 5 Given the Main Assumptions of Section 4 and (21), the value functions V , V (19)
are bounded and continuous in (x, y) ∈ B(w,z), for all (w, z) ∈ {−1, 1} × {−1, 1}.
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Proof: We prove the proposition for V , being the proof for V similar. We are going to use the
notations of Section 4.
The boundedness of V is easily seen, by the boundedness of ` and the positivity of the discount
factor λ > 0.
Let us fix ε > 0 and take T > 0 such that, for all possible trajectories and controls entering
the cost `, it is
∫ +∞
T
e−λt`dt ≤ ε. Moreover take a compact K ⊂ Rn × Rm, and, for a fixed pair
(w, z) take (x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ B(w,z) ∩K such that ‖(x1, y1)− (x2, y2)‖ ≤ δ, where δ > 0 is given
in Proposition 4, with respect to T and K.
Take γ2 ∈ Γ which realizes V (x2, y2, w, z) up to an ε-error, and consider γˆ2 ∈ Γ as the one in
Proposition 4, with respect to T,K, (w, z), and (x1, y1), (x2, y2). We get
V (x1, y1, w, z)− V (x2, y2, w, z) ≤
sup
β∈B
J(x1, y1, w, z, γˆ2[β], β)− sup
β∈B
J(x2, y2, w, z, γ2[β], β) + ε ≤
J(x1, y1, w, z, γˆ2[βˆ1], β1)− J(x2, y2, w, z, γ2[βˆ1], βˆ1) + 2ε
(30)
where, β1 ∈ B realizes the supremum in the first addendum of the second line up to an ε-error,
and βˆ1 is as in Proposition 4 as before. Recalling the definition of T , using again Proposition 4,
and continuing with the inequalities (30), we get
V (x1, y1, w, z)− V (x2, y2, w, z) ≤
JT (x1, y1, w, z, γˆ2[βˆ1], β1)− JT (x2, y2, w, z, γ2[βˆ1], βˆ1) + 4ε ≤
ωT,K(‖(x1, y1)− (x2, y2)‖+ 4ε
from which, as usual, by the arbitrariness of ε > 0, of the compact K and of the points, we get
the required continutiy. uunionsq
Proposition 6 Given the Main Assumptions of Section 4 and (21), then V and V respectively
satisfy
V (x, y, w, z) =
inf
γ∈Γ
sup
β∈B
(∫ τ
0
e−λs` (X(s), Y (s), w, z, γ[β](s), β(s)) ds+ e−λτV (X(τ), Y (τ), (w, z)+)
)
V (x, y, w, z) =
sup
ξ∈χ
sup
α∈A
(∫ τ
0
e−λs` (X(s), Y (s), w, z, α(s), ξ[α](s)) ds+ e−λτV (X(τ), Y (τ), (w, z)+)
)
where X(s) = X(s;x, γ[β], β), Y (s) = Y (s; y, α, ξ[α]), τ is the first switching instant and
(w, z)+ =
 (−w, z) if τ = τX < τY(−w − z) if τ = τX = τY
(w,−z) if τ = τY < τX
is the first “switched” label.
Proof. We only prove the equality for V . We recall that, in our definition, the switching occurs
when the threshold is by passed. This is the reason for which we consider instants a little bit
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larger than the switching time, see τn here below. We will also use the estimates (34) which will
be discussed in the next section.
Let us denote by p = (x, y, w, z) ∈ B(w,z) × {(w, z)} any admissible state and, by pp(·; γ[β], β)
the corrresponding trajectory. Let us denote by ω(p) the right-hand side of the equality.
Let us fix ε > 0 and, and for any p′ let γp′ ∈ Γ be such that
V (p′) ≥ sup
β∈B
J(p′, γp′ [β], β)− ε
Claim: V (p) ≤ ω(p).
For every natural number n > 0, let us take γn ∈ Γ such that
ωn(p) ≥ sup
β∈B
(∫ τn
0
e−λs` (X(s), Y (s), w(s), z(s), γn[β](s), β(s)) ds+
e−λτnV (X(τn), Y (τn), w(τn), z(τn)
)
− ε
where τn = τp[γn, β] + 1/n and
ωn(p) = inf
γ∈Γ
sup
β∈B
(∫ τn
0
e−λs` (X(s), Y (s), w(s), z(s), γ[β](s), β(s)) ds+
e−λτnV (X(τn), Y (τn), w(τn), z(τn))
)
For β ∈ B, we defining pn = pp(τn; γn[β], β), and δn ∈ Γ as
δn[β](s) =
{
γn[β](s) if 0 ≤ s ≤ τn
γpn [β(·+ τn)](s− τn) if s ≥ τn
Arguing as in Bardi-Capuzzo Dolcetta [4] page 437-438, we eventually get
ωn(p) ≥ sup
β∈B
J(p, δn[β], β)− 2ε ≥ V (p)− 2ε
By the arbitrariness of ε > 0 the claim is proved if we prove that ωn(p) − ω(p) ≤ O(1/n) as
n → +∞, where O is an infinitesimal function as its argument tends to zero. For ε > 0, take
γε ∈ Γ and βε ∈ B such that
ωn(p)− ω(p) ≤∫ τεn
0
e−λt`(X(s), Y (s),W (s), Z(s), γε[βε](s), βε(s))ds+ e−λτ
ε
nV (pn)−∫ τε
0
e−λt`(X(s), Y (s), w, z, γε[βε](s), βε(s))− e−λτεV (pswitched) + 2ε
(31)
where τε is the first switching instant, depending on γε and βε. In particular,
ω(p) ≥
sup
β∈B
(∫ τε
0
e−λs` (X(s), Y (s), w, z, γε[β](s), β(s)) ds+ e−λτ
ε
V (pswitched)
)
− ε (32)
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and pswitched = (X(τ
ε), Y (τε), (w, z)+). In order to estimate the second member in (31), we
essentially need to compare the values V (pn) and V (pswitched), which may have different switching
variables, if pn has an immediate switching after the one of pswitch at time τ
ε.
We denote pswitch = (X(τ
ε), Y (τε), w, z). It is not restrictive to assume that γε is such that,
whenever for some β it is pswitch ∈ ∂ΩwX × ∂ΩzY × {(w, z)} (i.e. it is a point of possible double
switch), (w, z)+ = (w,−z) (that is only Y switches), and V (pswitched) < V (X(τε), Y (τε),−w,−z),
then there exists ζ > 0 such that the trajectory does not switch again (that is X does not switch)
in ]τε, τε + ζ[ (if ζ is sufficiently small, then certainly Y does not switch again because it has just
switched and hence, to do that, it needs to reach the other threshold). Indeed, we can consider γ′ε
defined as
γ′ε[β](t) =

γε[β](t) if 0 ≤ t ≤ τε
and
γε[β](t) if t ≥ τε and pswitched 6∈ ∂ΩwX × ∂ΩzY × {(w, z)}
otherwise:
γε[β](t) if t ≥ τε, and V (pswitched) = V (X(τε), Y (τε),−w,−z)
a0 if t ≥ τε, and V (pswitched) < V (X(τε), Y (τε),−w,−z)
where a0 is inward-pointing in (X(τ
ε), w), and we have that γ′ε still satisfies (32). We can then
always assume that, if pswitch ∈ ∂ΩwX × ∂ΩzY × {(w, z)}, then
(w, z)+ = (w,−z) and V (pswitched) < V (X(τε), Y (τε),−w,−z) =⇒
(wn, zn) = (w,−z) for large n, (33)
where (wn, zn) is the actual switching variable of pn. Since (wn, zn) = (w, z)
+ for large n whenever
pswtich 6∈ ∂ΩwX × ∂ΩzY × {(w, z)}, as well as whenever pswtich ∈ ∂ΩwX × ∂ΩzY × {(w, z)} and
(w, z) = (−w,−z), in these three cases, by the continuity of V , we get the convergence V (pn) →
V (pswitched). Two other cases remain when pswitch ∈ ∂ΩwX × ∂ΩzY × {(w, z)}. In both we use (34)
and the continuity of V .
1) (w, z)+ = (−w, z) =⇒ V (pswitched) ≥ V (pn) +O
(
1
n
)
;
2) (w, z)+ = (w,−z) and V (pswitched) = V (X(τε), Y (τε),−w,−z)
=⇒ V (pswitched) ≥ V (pn) +O
(
1
n
)
,
where, in 2) we used the fact that, by (34), it cannot be V (pswitched) > V (X(τ
ε), Y (τε),−w,−z),
and that, if (w, z)+ = (w,−z) it cannot be (wn, zn) = (−w, z) because z is already switched at the
time τε.
Hence, in any case we get V (pswitched) ≥ V (pn) + O
(
1
n
)
and, by the obvious convergence of the
integrals in (31), we get the desired estimate.
Claim: V (x, y, w, z) ≥ ω(x, y, w, z).
Arguing as in Bardi-Capuzzo Dolcetta [4] page 437–438 we can prove that (with the same
notations as in the previous step), for any ε > 0
ωn(p) ≤ V (p) + 3ε
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The conclusion then still holds because we also have ω(p)−ωn(p) ≤ O(1/n). Indeed, reversing
the roles of ω and ωn in (31),(32), we have that if, (wn, zn) = (−w, z) or (wn, zn) = (w,−z) then
(w, z)+ = (wn, zn); moreover if (wn, zn) = (−w,−z) for all n then also (w, z)+ = (−w,−z). uunionsq
6 The HJI systems and uniqueness
By Proposition 6, for every (w, z) ∈ {−1, 1}, on B(w,z) the lower value function V of the infi-
nite horizon problem can be interpreted as the lower value function of the exit-time/exit-costs
differential game with dynamics (x, a) 7→ f(x,w, a), (y, b) 7→ g(y, z, b), running cost (x, y, a, b) 7→
`(x, y, w, z, a, b) and exit costs (using the same notations as in Section 3)
ΨX(·, ·) = V (·, ·,−w, z), ΨXY (·, ·) = V (·, ·,−w,−z), ΨY (·, ·) = V (·, ·, w,−z),
and similarly for the upper value function V . Moreover, under the controllability hypothesis
(21) such costs satisfy the compatibility hypothesis in (12), here stated for V ∈ {V , V }: for all
(x, y) ∈ ∂ΩwX × ∂ΩzY
V (x, y, w,−z) ≤ V (x, y,−w,−z) ≤ V (x, y,−w, z), (34)
Indeed, consider the double switched state (x, y,−w,−z). Since X minimizes, and since from the
Y -only switched state (x, y, w,−z) it may freely decide to switch or not, it is
V (x, y, w,−z) ≤ V (x, y,−w − z).
Indeed, from the position (x, y, w,−z) X has at its disposal all the admissible trajectories starting
from (x, y) and lying in B(w,−z), at least for a while, as well as all the admissible trajectories starting
from (x, y) and immediately moving in B(−w,−z). By minimization, the previous inequality holds.
Symmetrically it holds for the maximizing player Y , getting V (x, y,−w,−z) ≤ V (x, y,−w, z).
For every (w, z) fixed, we define, respectively, the upper Hamiltonian and the lower Hamiltonian
for (x, y, p, q) ∈ Rn × Rm × Rn × Rm, as
UH(w,z)(x, y, p, q) = min
b∈B
max
a∈A
{−f(x,w, a) · p− g(y, z, b) · q − `(x, y, w, z, a, b)},
LH(w,z)(x, y, p, q) = max
a∈A
min
b∈B
{−f(x,w, a) · p− g(y, z, b) · q − `(x, y, w, z, a, b)}
By the interpretation as exit-time/exit-costs on every sector B(w,z), by the continuity of the
value functions (Proposition 5), by the compatibility (34), and by Theorem 2, for every (w, z) fixed,
V (·, ·, w, z) and V (·, ·, w, z) are the unique bounded and continuous viscosity solutions u : B(w,z) →
R of the following Isaacs Dirichlet problems in B(w,z) (= Ω
w
X × Ω
z
Y ), with H(w,z) = UH(w,z) and
H(w,z) = LH(w,z) respectively
λu(x, y) +H(w,z)(x, y,∇xu(x, y),∇yu(x, y)) = 0 in intB(w,z)
u(x, y) = V (x, y,−w, z) on ∂ΩwX × ΩzY
u(x, y) = V (x, y,−w,−z) on ∂ΩwX × ∂ΩzY
u(x, y) = V (x, y, w,−z) on ΩwX × ∂ΩzY
(35)
where the boundary conditions must be also interpreted in the viscosity sense as in (15)–(16).
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For a function
u :
⋃
(w,z)∈{−1,1}×{−1,1}
(
B(w,z) × (w, z)
)→ R
we consider the following problem (four Isaacs Dirichlet problems coupled by the boundary condi-
tions in the viscosity sense, that are mutually exchanged)
∀(w, z) ∈ {−1, 1} × {−1, 1}, u solves
λu(x, y, w, z) +H(w,z)(x, y,∇xu,∇yu) = 0 in intB(w,z)
u(x, y, x, w) = u(x, y,−w, z) on ∂ΩwX × ΩzY
u(x, y, w, z) = u(x, y,−w,−z) on ∂ΩwX × ∂ΩzY
u(x, y, w, z) = u(x, y, w,−z) on ΩwX × ∂ΩzY
(36)
Theorem 7 Under the Main Assumptions in Section 4 and the controllability (21), we get that
V (respectively V ) is the unique bounded and continuous viscosity solution of (36) with H(w,z) =
UH(w,z) (respectively H(w,z) = LH(w,z)), satisfying, for every (x, y, w, z) ∈ ∂ΩwX × ∂ΩzY × {(w, z)}
u(x, y, w,−z) ≤ u(x, y,−w,−z) ≤ u(x, y,−w, z). (37)
Proof. The fact that V and V are solutions is explained here above. For the uniqueness, we
are going to use a fixed point argument applied to a suitable functional defined on the subset C of
the space
X =
u : ⋃
w,z∈{−1,1}
(
B(w,z) × {(w, z)}
)→ R∣∣∣u is continuous and bounded

given by
C =
{
u ∈ X
∣∣∣ u satisfies (37)}
Endowed with the uniform convergence topology, C is a complete metric space. Also note that
V , V ∈ C. We prove the uniqueness results for the system (36) corresponding to the case H(w,z) =
UH(w,z) (i.e. the case solved by V ). The other case is similar.
The construction of the functional is performed in three steps.
First step. We construct a functional T1 : C → X in the following way. Given u ∈ C,
for every (w, z) fixed, the functions u(·, ·,−w, z), u(·, ·,−w,−z) and u(·, ·, w,−z) give suitable
boundary conditions for the sub-problem in (36) with that (w, z) fixed (also compare with (35)).
In particular, they are continuous and satisfy (37). Let us denote by T1[u;w, z] : B(w,z) → R
such a unique solution. By Theorem 2, T1[u;w, z] is the lower value function of the exit-time
exit cost differential game with dynamics (x, a) 7→ f(x,w, a), (y, b) 7→ g(y, z, b), running cost
(x, y, a, b) 7→ `(x, y, w, z, a, b) and exit costs given by the values of u as before. Hence, we define
the image of u ∈ C via T1 as
T1[u] :
⋃
(w,z)∈{−1,1}×{−1,1}
(
B(w,z) × (w, z)
)→ R, (x, y, w, z) 7→ T1[u;w, z](x, y) (38)
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In general, we cannot guarantee that T1[u] ∈ C, because it may not satisfy (37), but certainly
it belongs to X. However, it satisfies similar inequalities as (37), that is, for every (x, y, w, z) ∈
∂ΩwX × ∂ΩzY × {(w, z)}
T1[u](x, y, w,−z) ≤ u(x, y,−w,−z) ≤ T1[u](x, y,−w, z) (39)
which can be proved similarly to (34), because, for example, from the point (x, y, w,−z) if X exits
(the minimizing player), then the cost paid is u(x, y,−w,−z).
Second step. We construct a functional T2 : C → X similarly to T1 with the only difference that,
the exit costs on the corner points (x, y, w, z) ∈ ∂ΩwX×∂ΩzY ×{(w, z)} are given by T1[u](x, y−w, z)
(ΨX) and T1[u](x, y, w,−z) (ΨY ) if only X or only Y exits, respectively, and by u(x, y,−w,−z)
itself (ΨXY ) for the case of simultaneous exit. In this way, by (39), the costs ΨX ,ΨY ,ΨXY
satisfies (37). We then construct T2[u] as in the first step. Again, we have for every (x, y, w, z) ∈
∂ΩwX × ∂ΩzY × {(w, z)}
T2[u](x, y, w,−z) ≤ T1[u](x, y,−w,−z) ≤ T2[u](x, y,−w, z).
Note that, when (x, y, w, z) ∈ ∂ΩwX × ∂ΩzY ×{(w, z)}, then from (x, y, w,−z) only X can exit from
B(w,−z), and hence, in that case, the paid cost is T1[u].
Third step. We construct a functional T3 : C → X, as in the second step, but using T2[u] as
exit costs for the exit of X and Y only, and T1[u] for the simultaneous exit.
It is evident that any solution u ∈ C of (36) is a fixed point of T3 (as well as of T1 and T2), and
in particular V is a fixed point of T3. Hence a fixed point of T3 exists: V . We now prove that T3
is a contraction and so it admits at most one fixed point, which means that (36) admits at most
one a solution in C, V . From which the proof will be concluded.
Let us take two functions u1, u2 ∈ C and a point (x, y, w, z). By construction
T1[u
i](x, y, w, z) = V i(w,z)(x, y) := inf
γ∈Γ
sup
β∈B
J i(w,z)(x, y, γ[β], β) =
inf
γ∈Γ
sup
β∈B
(∫ τ
0
`(X(s), Y (s), γ[β](s), β(s), w, z) + e−λτui(X(τ), Y (τ), (w, z)+)
)
where τ is the exit time from B(w,z), and (w, z)
+ is (−w, z), (w,−z), (−w,−z) if only X exits, only
Y exits, or they simultaneously exit, respectively.
Let us fix ε > 0. For suitable γ¯ ∈ Γ, β¯ ∈ B, by definition of infimum and supremum, we have
T1[u
1](x, y, w, z)− T1[u2](x, y, w, z) = V 1(w,z)(x, y)− V 2(x,y)(x, y) =
≤ J1(w,z)(x, y, γ¯[β¯], β¯)− J2(w,z)(x, y, γ¯[β¯], β¯) + 2ε
(40)
Note that both J1 and J2 are concerning with the same dynamics and running cost, because
they are governed by the same controls γ¯[β¯] and β¯, starting from the same point (x, y), the
possible exit time τ from B(w,z) is the same, and moreover the possible switched label (w, z)
+
is also the same. Hence, they may differ only for the paid exit cost, which is then paid in the
same point (X(τ), Y (τ)) and with the same discount e−λτ . If the trajectory does not exit, then
the difference of the J i’s in the second member of (40) is zero. Otherwise it is of the form
e−λτ (u1(X(τ), Y (τ), (w, z)+)− u2(X(τ), Y (τ), (w, z)+)). Hence we have
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T1[u
1](x, y, w, z)− T1[u2](x, y, w, z) ≤
≤ e−λτu1(X(τ), Y (τ), (w, z)+)− u2(X(τ), Y (τ), (w, z)+) + 2ε (41)
Note that, in case of exit in finite time, if w+ = −w then X(τ) has a distance from ∂Ω−wX equal
to 0 < ρ1 − ρ−1, if z+ = −z then Y (τ) has a distance from ∂Ω−zY equal to 0 < η1 − η−1.
Applying the same reasoning to T2, we obtain:
T2[u
1](x, y, w, z)− T2[u2](x, y, w, z) ≤
e−λσ
(
Ψ1(X(σ), Y (σ), (w, z)+)−Ψ2(X(σ), Y (σ), (w, z)+))+ 2ε
where Ψi is the corresponding exit cost as from the construction of T2 and σ is the possible exit
time (corresponding to the choice of suitable γ¯ and β¯ as before). In particular, if only X or only
Y exits then Ψi = T1[u
i], otherwise, in case of simultaneous exit, it is ui.
Similarly for T3
T3[u
1](x, y, w, z)− T3[u2](x, y, w, z) ≤
e−λν
(
Φ1(X(ν), Y (ν), (w, z)+)− Φ2(X(ν), Y (ν), (w, z)+))+ 2ε
where Φi is the corresponding exit cost as from the construction of T3 and ν is the possible exit
time (corresponding to the choice of suitable γ¯ and β¯ as before). In particular, if only X or only
Y exits then Φi = T2[u
i], otherwise, in case of simultaneous exit, it is T1[u
i].
Now, suppose that (X(ν), Y (ν), (w, z)+) = (X(ν), Y (ν),−w, z), then
T3[u
1](x, y, w, z)− T3[u2](x, y, w, z) ≤
e−λν
(
T2[u
1](X(ν), Y (ν),−w, z)− T2[u2](X(ν), Y (ν),−w, z)
)
+ 2ε.
It is
T2[u
1](X(ν), Y (ν),−w, z)− T2[u2](X(ν), Y (ν),−w, z) ≤
e−λσ
(
Ψ1(X(σ), Y (σ), (−w, z)+)−Ψ2(X(σ), Y (σ), (−w, z)+))+ 2ε,
and suppose that (−w, z)+ = (w,−z), then Ψi = ui and ‖X(ν)−X(σ)‖ ≥ ρ1−ρ−1, which implies
σ >
ρ1 − ρ−1
M
> 0
where M is a bound for the dynamics. We then get
T3[u
1](x, y, w, z)− T3[u2](x, y, w, z) ≤
e−λ(ν+σ)
(
u1(X(σ), Y (σ),−w, z)− u2(X(σ), Y (σ),−w, z)+ 4ε ≤
e−λ(σ+ν)‖u1 − u2‖∞ + 4ε
If instead, for example, the sequence of the switching variables is (w, z)→ (−w, z)→ (−w,−z)→
(−w, z), then
T3[u
1](x, y, w, z)− T3[u2](x, y, w, z) ≤
e−λ(ν+σ+τ)
(
u1(X(τ), Y (τ),−w, z)− u2(X(τ), Y (τ),−w, z)+ 6ε ≤
e−λ(ν+σ+τ)‖u1 − u2‖∞ + 6ε
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where
τ >
η1 − η−1
M
> 0
because ‖Y (σ)− Y (τ)‖ ≥ η1 − η−1. Similarly for the other cases.
By the arbitrariness of ε > 0 and of the point (x, y, w, z), setting
h = min
{
ρ1 − ρ−1
M
,
η1 − η−1
M
}
> 0
we get
‖T3[u1]− T3[u2]‖∞ ≤ e−λh‖u1 − u2‖∞.
uunionsq
Remark 8 By the uniqueness Theorem 7, whenever the Hamiltonians LH and UH are equal,
then we get V = V , that is the differential game has an equilibrium. As usual, the equality of the
Hamiltonians can be assured by some particular structure of the running cost `, for example if,
besides the already assumed decoupling feature as in the Main Assumptions in Section 4, it is also
of the form `(x, y, w, z, a, b) = `1(x, y, w, z) + `2(a) + `3(b).
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